A combination of considerations – law, discipline, morality, and utility – illustrate the extent to which the offense of looting is bad for its perpetrators and for the entire IDF. It violates the law, morality, military ethics, and impairs the operational capability and professionalism of the military organization as a combat body.

E.5 Universal combat ethics

The absolute prohibition on looting – that is, “theft or robbery of enemy property (private or public) by individual soldiers for their private purposes” (Y. Dinstein, Laws of War [Tel Aviv, 1983], p. 156) – was adopted in international customary law and was later enshrined in the Hague Regulations (articles 28 and 47) and in article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 1949. In many countries, this prohibition has been set forth in statute. For example, in the United States, section 103 of the Uniform Code of Military Justices states:

(a) All persons subject to this chapter will secure all public property taken from the enemy for the service of the United States, and shall give notice and turn over to the proper authority without delay all captured or abandoned property in their possession, custody, or control.

(b) any person subject to this chapter who-

(1) fails to carry out the duties prescribed in subsection (a);

(2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of captured or abandoned property, whereby he receives or expects any profit, benefit, or a advantage to himself or another directly or indirectly connected with himself; or
(3) engages in looting or pillaging;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

To close provision see the Australian law Defence Force Discipline act 1982 at sec. 48; and the Canadian law, National Defence Act. Part III Code of Service Discipline at sec. 77

p. 15:

An example of adoption in international law of the absolute prohibition on looting can be found in the judgment of the international criminal tribunal that was established in regard to war crimes in Yugoslavia (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia), which held that acts of looting, such as those that are motivated by greed, are war crimes for which the looter is to be held criminally liable:

"[I]t is to be observed that the prohibition against the unjustified appropriation of public and private enemy property is general in scope, and extends both to acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for their private gain, and to the organized seizure of property undertaken within the framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory. Contrary to the submissions of the Defence, the fact that it was acts of the latter category which were made the subject of prosecutions before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg and in the subsequent proceedings before the Nurnberg Military Tribunals does not demonstrate the absence of individual criminal liability under international law for individual acts of pillage committed by perpetrators motivated by personal greed. In contrast, when seen in a historical perspective, it is clear that the prohibition against pillage was directed precisely against violations of the latter kind. Consistent with this view, isolated instances of theft of personal property of modest value were treated as war crimes in a number of trials before French Military Tribunals following the Second World War. Commenting upon this fact, the United Nations War Crimes
Commission correctly described such offences as "war crimes of the more traditional type”. **Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et. ICTY Case no. IT-96-21-T (Celebici camp case) Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998 at par. 590**